The Role of Attention in a Joint-Action Effect by Doneva, Silviya P & Cole, Geoff G
The Role of Attention in a Joint-Action Effect
Silviya P. Doneva*, Geoff G. Cole
Department of Psychology, University of Essex, United Kingdom
Abstract
The most common explanation for joint-action effects has been the action co-representation account in which observation
of another’s action is represented within one’s own action system. However, recent evidence has shown that the most
prominent of these joint-action effects (i.e., the Social Simon effect), can occur when no co-actor is present. In the current
work we examined whether another joint-action phenomenon (a movement congruency effect) can be induced when a
participant performs their part of the task with a different effector to that of their co-actor and when a co-actor’s action is
replaced by an attention-capturing luminance signal. Contrary to what is predicted by the action co-representation account,
results show that the basic movement congruency effect occurred in both situations. These findings challenge the action
co-representation account of this particular effect and suggest instead that it is driven by bottom-up mechanisms.
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Introduction
Joint-action processes have generated a considerable amount of
interest amongst cognitive psychologists over the past decade or so.
This work has often shown that acting together with another
individual on a task differs from individual performance on the
same task [1–4]. Furthermore, joint-action phenomena reflect
many everyday situations where coordination and synchronization
between individuals is often required.
One of the most popular paradigms to study joint-action
generates the so-called Social Simon effect (also known as the
interactive/joint Simon task), first reported by Sebanz and
colleagues [3]. The task is carried out jointly by two individuals
with one of them responding to the appearance of, say, a
particular colour by pressing a left key, whereas the other presses a
right key when a different colour is displayed. Typical results
reveal a basic ‘‘Simon effect’’; participants are quicker to respond
to stimuli appearing on the side of the display associated with their
button (e.g., left key press, a stimulus appearing to the left). The
standard Simon task, in which one participant makes both left and
right responses, is usually explained by the event coding approach
[5]. According to it, perception and action share a common
representational system and actions are therefore coded by their
perceivable effects. Thus, response facilitation arises when the
stimulus is compatible with the action. Conversely, a stimulus-
response mismatch creates competition between the stimulus-
primed location and the location that requires a response [6].
Consequently, the Simon effect is only present when two
participants share the task (social version) or when an individual
performs alone but operates both responses (standard version).
However, the effect is abolished in the single-participant Simon
paradigm where the participant operates only one of the buttons
[7].
A considerable amount of research has examined the properties
of the Social Simon effect since for some time it has been
considered a signature joint-action phenomenon. The action co-
representation account, put forward by Sebanz et al. [3], [4] is an
appealing explanation for the observed slowing down of responses,
following a stimulus-response mismatch. According to this theory
individuals represent their partner’s actions irrespective of their
own target and even in situations when ignoring the partner’s task
would have been more beneficial [1]. In terms of brain structures,
the human parietal and premotor regions are believed to comprise
the action observation network, also known as the mirror neuron
system (MNS) [8], [9]. However, more recent research has
suggested that it could extend to other cerebral parts as well [10],
[11]. For example, in an fMRI study, which investigated the
neural basis of perceptual bias on action, a network of five regions
was found to subserve the effect [11]. Although most activation
occurred in the mirror neuron network, activation was found in
other areas, such as the primary motor cortex and the inferior
frontal gyrus. The authors also suggested that since implicit
perception and explicit action observation/imitation activated the
same cerebral network, it is plausible to conclude that this network
automatically responds to action observation. Moreover, action
mirroring has become a popular mediating mechanism explana-
tion for other joint-action effects [12]. However, although the
MNS is believed to be the predominant neural correlate of joint-
action, some researchers have expressed doubts not only about its
role in action understanding but also about its existence per se
[13], [14].
Recently, evidence has been reported which challenges the idea
that the Social Simon effect is ‘‘social’’ in nature. Indeed, it is
difficult to reconcile how an effect, believed to depend on
automatic action co-representation still occurs when no online
visual or auditory feedback about the partner has been made
available [15]. Furthermore, Dolk and colleagues [16], [17]
showed that no partner is required for a Social Simon-like effect to
occur. In a modified version of the task, involving the rubber hand
illusion [18], Dolk et al. [16] demonstrated that the effect
increased when there was a greater difference between the actions
of the two co-actors. However, the opposite would be expected if
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automatic action co-representation was driving the phenomenon,
as suggested by Sebanz and colleagues [3], [4]. In addition, the
Social Simon effect was found even when the partner was not
actively involved in the task and most importantly – when there
was no partner at all, only the stroking device, used for the rubber
hand illusion, was in operation. In a follow-up paper, Dolk and
collaborators [17] again demonstrated that social actors were not
necessary for the effect to occur. In a series of experiments, the
effect was still observed when different attention-capturing events
replaced the co-actor. For instance, in one experiment participants
performed the task alongside objects which possessed no biological
features, such as a clock and a metronome. This follows previous
joint-action work in which the biological partner is either replaced
by a non-biological imitation of a real partner (e.g., a wooden
hand) [19], or a computer [20]. The Dolk et al. (2013) findings
were explained with the referential coding theory [21], according
to which stimuli are spatially coded in reference to other events
that are either voluntarily attended to or salient enough to attract
attention. Thus, the alternative response location in the Social
Simon condition is thought to be coded in reference to the person,
object or event that occurs there.
This line of research leaves open the possibility that other joint-
action effects might be due to bottom-up processes, rather than
action co-representation. To assess this we conducted two
experiments using another joint-action paradigm commonly
employed [22–30]. In the basic procedure, two participants sit
opposite each other across a table (that incorporates a flat touch
screen monitor) and take turns to reach out and touch one of two
targets that appear on either the left or right hand side of the
workspace. Typical results show that reaction time (RT) is shorter
when a participant’s target position requires them to make the
same reaching action as the one their co-actor just performed.
Thus, for instance, if Participant A reaches to their right (because
their target appeared there) Participant B will be quicker to reach
to their own right. Most authors propose that action co-
representation mechanisms contribute to the effect, at least in
part, with some suggesting that the effect is solely due to processes
that give rise to action congruency effects [24]. Such effects are
known to occur and have been demonstrated with a variety of
actions [31], [32]. Thus, when Participant A reaches to their right,
Participant B is said to be quicker to reach to their own right
because this is a congruent mirroring action within an egocentric
framework.
In the present Experiment 1 we examined whether this
particular movement congruency effect would still occur even if
the co-actors used different parts of their body to make a response,
and thus no action congruency or mirroring could take place.
Experiment 2 then examined the ‘‘socialness’’ of the basic effect by
assessing whether another person was even necessary to induce the
phenomenon.
Experiment 1: Acting with a Co-actor, Responding
with Their Arm or Foot
Recall that the action co-representation account proposes that
co-actors in joint-action tasks ‘‘form shared representations of tasks
quasi automatically’’ and that ‘‘the other’s task … [is] …
represented in a functionally equivalent way to one’s own’’ [33],
p.72. Furthermore, this is thought to be subserved by the MNS
which has been found to be active both during action execution
and action observation in humans and monkeys [34]. It follows
therefore that if the two co-actors use different parts of their body
to respond, no movement congruency effect should be observed
because different actions are being performed. In other words, a
movement congruency effect should not occur if the observed and
the required actions mismatch not only visually but also
kinesthetically. Indeed, research on action co-representation
suggests that some actions are only simulated when the two co-
actors are similar enough [35], [36]. In Experiment 1 we
employed a variant of the standard arm movement congruency
effect described in the Introduction in which participants reached
with their hand/arm to the target location. Importantly, their
(confederate) co-actor either also used her hand/arm to respond or
her leg/foot.
Methods
Ethics Statement. Ethical approval from the ethics commit-
tee of the University of Essex was obtained prior to commence-
ment of the two experiments. All participants gave their written
informed consent to take part in this research.
Participants. A volunteer sample of 21 (9 male; 12 female)
participants aged between 20 and 45 (M= 25.38 years, SD= 7.05
years) took part. All of them were students at the University of
Essex who participated in exchange for £4. All were right-handed
and were naı¨ve to the purposes of the study.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimuli were displayed on a 19.5-inch LCD touch-screen
monitor built flat into a table, raised 74 cm from the floor. They
were presented against a uniform white background (74.6 cd/m2).
The two co-actors sat facing one another such that the distance
between their chests and their ‘‘home buttons’’ was approximately
160 mm (See Fig. 1). In the foot condition, the confederate sat on
a chair raised 58 cm from the floor, whereas participants in all
conditions and the confederate in the hand condition were seated
at a height of approximately 44 cm. The 4 stimulus locations were
denoted by 4 black squares (19.6 mm2 each) which acted as
‘‘placeholders’’, and remained present for the entire trial duration.
Two placeholders (1 to the left, 1 to the right), located at a distance
of 160 mm from the black fixation cross and protruding 50 mm to
the left and to the right of the screen midline were displayed in
front of each participant. The distance between the left and the
right placeholder was 320 mm. The squares were placed within a
light-grey area, covering 200 mm2 of the screen. On each trial,
one of them illuminated by turning white (74.6 cd/m2). Partici-
pants made their response by releasing the ‘‘home’’ button and
touching the square that had illuminated. An RM Pentium PC
custom software was used for the stimulus generation and
recording of the responses.
Design and Procedure
The experiment employed a 2 (movement congruency:
congruent, incongruent)62 (effector: hand, foot) fully within-
participants design. A movement congruent action was one in
which the participant reached out to the target that appears on the
same side as the partner’s previous response within an egocentric
framework. For instance, reaching to the left when their co-actor
had just reached to her left. Note that in keeping with some of the
literature [24] we refer to the two levels of this factor as movement
congruent/incongruent. However, when the confederate used her
leg, actions were never congruent because the participant always
responded with their hand. The dependent variable in both
experiments was the time that elapsed between the target
presentation and the target (i.e., screen) being touched.
All participants were tested individually and performed the task
with the same confederate. The confederate always sat in the same
position relative to the workspace (See Fig. 1). The experimenter
verbally explained the instructions after which she performed a
Socialness in Joint Action
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short demonstration of the procedure. The confederate’s initial
response triggered the target sequence in which co-actors
alternated single responses. They were instructed to keep the
home buttons pressed until a response was needed whilst at the
same time fixating the cross in the centre of the screen. Then
participants were required to reach out with their right hand and
touch the target location, which illuminated for 100 ms. All trials
had an inter-trial interval of 350 ms and a stimulus onset
asynchrony (SOA) of approximately 1000 ms. Since SOA refers
to the time between the release of the home button of Participant
A and the target onset of Participant B, the duration of a trial
varied slightly depending on individual differences in response
speed. Participants performed two experimental blocks of 209
trials (i.e., 104 per participant plus the first trial which was not
analysed since no response preceded it) by using their right hand to
make the responses. However, in one of the blocks the confederate
responded with her right hand whereas in the other – with her
right foot (the block order was counterbalanced across partici-
pants). Regardless of which limb was used by the confederate, both
the confederate and participant had a full view of each other and
each other’s targets and responses (See Fig. 1). Before commencing
with the experiment, each pair completed a practice session of 21
trials. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and as
accurately as possible.
Results and Discussion
RT outliers (more than two SDs above or below the mean) were
removed prior to the formal analyses. Mean RTs were computed
as a function of movement congruency (congruent, incongruent)
and effector (hand, foot) and entered into a 262 fully-within
participants ANOVA (See Fig. 2). The main effect of effector was
significant (F (1, 20) = 30.92, p,.001, partial eta sq = .607). Thus,
overall, participants were slower when the confederate responded
with her foot as compared to the standard hand condition. The
main effect of congruency was also significant (F (1, 20) = 17.75,
p,.001, partial eta sq = .470). Finally, there was no reliable
movement congruency x effector interaction (F (1, 20) = 3.89,
p..06, partial eta sq = .163). However, to test whether the
movement congruency phenomenon was present in both condi-
tions, we carried out follow-up comparisons. These analyses
confirmed that participants exhibited a congruency effect in both
the hand (t (1, 20) = 4.94, p,.001, Bonferroni adjusted al-
pha = .025) and the foot (t (1, 20) = 2.54, p,.02, Bonferroni
adjusted alpha = .025) condition. No difference in within-partic-
ipants’ variability in RT across conditions was found (Fs (1,
20).0.57, ps..307). Additionally, significant positive correlations
emerged between the participants’ and the confederate’s responses
in all four movement congruency-effector combinations (congru-
ent, hands: r (19) = .53, p,.013; incongruent, hands: r (19) = .46,
p,.035; congruent feet: r (19) = .54, p,.011; incongruent, feet: r
(19) = .61, p,.003).
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with previous work
on the present joint-action effect; participants are generally faster
to make a response that is congruent with their partner [22], [24],
[27]. However, this effect occurred even when participants used a
different effector to that used by their partner. This finding is not
in line with the action co-representation account according to
which action observation leads to automatic activation of motor
representations in the observer [31], [24], [3], [4]. Thus, our
results provide support for those reported by Dolk et al. [16]
because emphasising the difference between the observed and the
performed events should have prevented the integration of the
partner’s action into one’s motor system.
Finally, the significant main effect of effector can be accounted
for by the fact that the confederate was slower in the foot condition
and this affected the participants’ overall response tempo.
Moreover, the significant relationships between participants’ and
confederate’s responses reveal that participants, at some level,
must have been taking into account their task-partner and their
actions. Additionally, observing biological movements carried out
by another individual has been reported to bias one’s perception of
timing [37], [38]. For example, Kaneko and Murakami [38] found
that the speed of a stimulus was a significant predictor of how
participants perceived observed motion so that the apparent
duration proportionally increased with the speed logarithm.
Experiment 2: Acting with attention-capturing
cues, instead of a co-actor
Experiment 1 demonstrated that a common joint-action effect
could occur even when the two task-partners engaged in very
different actions. However, it could be argued that action co-
representation was still occurring even when a different effector
was used to that observed. For instance, the observed action could
have been coded as ‘‘reaching to the right of their visual space’’.
Furthermore, even if participants did not represent the partner’s
actions per se, they may have coded the actor’s action intention or
goal [39]. Indeed, evidence exists showing that the movement
congruency effect employed here may represent the intended goal
[24] but see [22]. This is further supported by work suggesting that
the MNS codes for intentions rather than body movement per se
[40]. As Rizzolatti and colleagues [41], p. 25 argue, ‘‘For most
mirror neurons, however, the relationship between the effective
observed and executed motor acts is based on their common goal
(e.g., grasping), regardless of how this goal is achieved’’.
In Experiment 2 therefore we examined whether the present
movement congruency effect could be induced when participants
performed the basic task but with no co-actor present, as in Dolk
et al. [17]. Thus, where the partner would normally respond,
Figure 1. An illustration of the standard condition in the
movement congruency paradigm used in Experiments 1 and 2.
Each person takes turns to reach out and touch one of two targets
presented on the left or right. In the figure shown, one person is
reaching to their right where the target has illuminated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091336.g001
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attention- capturing cues moved across the display to the target
(see Fig. 3).
Methods
Participants. A volunteer sample of 20 (7 male; 13 female)
participants aged between 19 and 32 (M= 22.50 years, SD= 3.17
years) took part in the study. All were undergraduates at the
University of Essex, were right-handed, and naı¨ve to the purposes
of the study. They received £4 for their participation.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The apparatus was as reported in Experiment 1. The black
rectangular transients in the partner-absent condition had an area
of 270 mm2. They were either displayed 40 mm to the left or
40 mm to the right of the screen midline, depending on which
target location had illuminated on the partner’s side of the table.
Design and Procedure
The experiment employed a 262 fully within-participants
design. One factor manipulated presence of co-actor (present,
absent) whilst the other factor manipulated movement congruency
(congruent, incongruent). ‘‘Congruency of action’’ in the co-actor-
absent condition refers to, for instance, a rightward reaching
response when the attention-capturing cues have also just moved
to the right, as seen from the viewpoint of a co-actor had they been
present.
The procedure in the co-actor-present condition was identical
to the hand condition in Experiment 1 with the difference that two
participants were tested simultaneously (i.e., there was no
confederate in this experiment). In the co-actor-absent condition,
however, only one of the participants was tested at a time, while
the other was waiting with the experimenter. The participant’s
initial response triggered the target sequence in which the
participant reached out and touched the target location, as in
the co-actor-present condition. However, rather than a co-actor
responding, a sequence of 4 black rectangular transients appeared
(See Fig. 3). The first transient was displayed 100 ms after one of
the target locations had illuminated. Every new transient appeared
for 75 ms and then once the fourth transient reached and covered
the target location, they began disappearing at 75 ms-intervals
following a backward sequence. Each participant took part in two
experimental blocks, i.e., the co-actor-present and absent condi-
Figure 2. Mean RTs to localise targets as a function of effector and movement congruency in Experiment 1. Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091336.g002
Figure 3. Trial sequence in Experiment 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091336.g003
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tions (209 trials in a block, 104 per person plus the first trial which
was not analysed). The presentation order of the two blocks was
counterbalanced. As in Experiment 1, participants always had a
full view of their partner/rectangular transients, their targets and
their responses. Participants first watched a demonstration by the
experimenter and completed a 21-trial practice session. They were
instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.
Results and Discussion
As in Experiment 1 RT outliers (more than two SDs above or
below the mean) were removed prior to the analyses. Mean RTs
were computed as a function of movement congruency (congruent,
incongruent) and partner (present, absent) and entered into a 262
fully-within participants ANOVA (See Fig. 4). The main effect of
co-actor was significant (F (1, 19) = 5.65, p,.03, partial eta
sq = .229). Thus, RTs were shorter when the participant
performed with a co-actor than when they were responding
alone. The main effect of movement congruency was also
significant (F (1, 19) = 36.44, p,.001, partial eta sq = .657).
Finally, there was a significant movement congruency x partner
interaction (F (1, 19) = 7.89, p,.01, partial eta sq = .293). Planned
follow-up comparisons revealed that the joint-action effect was
present in both the co-actor-present (t (19) = 4.66, p,.001,
Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025) and the co-actor-absent condi-
tions (t (19) = 4.67, p,.001, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025).
Thus, essentially the interaction was driven by the significant
difference in making a movement incongruent response when
alone and when with a partner (t (19) = 3.00, p,.007, Bonferroni
adjusted alpha = .025; See Fig. 4). There was no such difference
between the two co-actor conditions when executing a congruent
response (p..115). Additionally, as in Experiment 1, we also
examined whether there was a difference in within-participants’
variability in RT as a function of condition. Again, none of the
effects reached significance (Fs (1, 19).0.03, ps..722). Moreover,
although there was a significant movement congruency by co-
actor interaction (F (1, 19) = 10.29, p,.005, partial eta sq = .351),
none of the simple main effects was significant.
The results of Experiment 2 are in line with those reported by
Dolk and colleagues [16], [17] since they showed that the presence
of a co-actor is not necessary for a joint-action effect to arise.
Moreover, the RT difference between making a movement
congruent and movement incongruent action was somewhat
bigger in the co-actor-absent condition (See Fig. 4). However, due
to a greater RT variability in this condition, the inferential
analyses indicated that the effect was similar to the one in the co-
actor-present condition.
Interestingly, there was a significant difference in RT between
making movement incongruent actions across the two partner
conditions but no such difference occurred when initiating
movement congruent actions. The latter fits well with the selective
attention account according to which people are slower to respond
to a previously attended location because they experience
inhibition of return (IOR) [42], [43]. Furthermore, it could be
assumed that the luminance transients were more attention-
capturing than the arm/hand movements since they were high
contrast and appeared abruptly. Indeed, abrupt visual onsets have
long been known to effectively attract attention [44–47]. In sum,
Experiment 2 provides evidence that a movement congruency
joint-action effect can be driven by exogenous cues in the absence
of a partner.
General Discussion
Recent work has demonstrated that a well-established joint-
action effect may not in fact be due to action co-representation.
Dolk et al. [16], [17] showed that the Social Simon effect, can be
generated when no partner is present. In the current experiments
we examined whether another joint-action phenomenon, i.e., a
movement congruency effect, may similarly be explained by a
non-co-representation account. We have found that the effect
emerged in two experiments even when action mirroring was not
possible due to a difference between the observed and the
performed action (Experiment 1) and when there was no partner
present (Experiment 2). These results clearly do not support an
explanation of the present movement congruency effect, based on
action co-representation, since if automatic integration of the
partner’s actions was indeed driving the effect, it should have been
abolished in the foot and co-actor-absent conditions.
The present findings can be placed within the context of other
work challenging the notion that action co-representation, via the
observer’s motor system, drives joint-action effects. For instance,
Vlainic et al. [15] showed that neither visual nor auditory
information about the partner’s actions was required for the Social
Simon effect to occur. Furthermore, according to the Coordina-
tion Dynamics Approach, the vital component for such effects to
occur is the emergent interpersonal motor coordination rather
than the mental simulation of the observed action [48–51].
Moreover, when considering the interference in movement
congruency paradigms, the proponents of this account suggest
that rather than being indicative of ‘‘error’’ the motor system
represents the necessary compensatory changes to ensure coordi-
nation across unequal kinematic requirements [50]. In support,
Fine et al. [49] manipulated the spatial congruence between the
participant and the confederate (i.e., whether they made
horizontal or vertical movements) and the anatomical congruence
(i.e., whether they were facing one another or the confederate was
rotated at 90u). The results showed that anatomical incongruence did
not create interference, suggesting that coordinating actions with
the actor did not depend on the simulation of postural-based
motor representations.
Rather than action co-representation, the present results seem
to fit better with a more bottom-up explanation of this particular
movement effect. One such explanation is IOR [43]. According to
this account, a partner’s reaching action shifts the observer’s
attention to the location of the response [22], [25–27]. Then,
when the partner returns their hand, the observer’s attention is
shifted back to the centre of the display. Consequently, when a
Figure 4. Mean RTs to localise targets as a function of partner
and movement congruency in Experiment 2. Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091336.g004
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target appears at the responded-to location, participants inhibit the
stimulus and/or a response to that position. Indeed, another way
of describing the movement congruency effect is to say that RTs
are longer when a participant is required to move to the same
location where their partner just reached to. This ‘‘social IOR’’
account (or ‘‘between-person IOR’’; [27–30]) predicts that any
transient event that shifts an observer’s attention will generate
inhibition at that location, including for instance, a moving foot or
moving transients as in our experiments. In support, human
features, in general, easily attract attention. For example, hands
have been found to affect the attentional prioritization of space
[52]. Furthermore, we can assume that the foot also captured
participants’ attention because of it being more unusual than a
hand. Along the same lines, the visual transients in Experiment 2
are likely to have automatically attracted the observer’s attention
because of their abrupt motion [46], [47]. Thus, although moving
transients replaced the biological partner in Experiment 2, what
may be important is the introduction of an event that is salient
enough to produce an attentional shift to that location. This
explains why the effect occurs even when the partner’s targets and
final part of the response (i.e., arm reach) are occluded from view –
the actor’s hand movement and gaze shift are enough to direct the
observer’s attention to that direction [25], [28].
We can only speculate about the neural basis of social IOR
since to the best of our knowledge there have not been any
published neuropsychological data on it. Still, behavioral research
has identified many similarities between basic IOR and its social
counterpart. For example, in a series of experiments Skarratt and
colleagues [25] demonstrated that, similarly to IOR, social IOR
arises during the perceptuo-attentional and/or motor program-
ming stages, prior to response initiation. Additionally, Welsh et al.
[29] reported a significant correlation between these two effects.
ERP studies have indicated that IOR is associated with a
modulation of early perceptual processing since a significant
amplitude reduction in the P1 and/or N1 signals is usually
observed during IOR tasks [53–57]. Additionally, results from
neuroimaging studies have revealed that the potential neural
correlates of spatial IOR could be found in a dorsal frontoparietal
network in the brain which includes the frontal eye field and the
superior parietal cortex [58–61]. Thus, if social IOR is indeed an
IOR effect, it should comprise an attentional and an oculomotor
component.
An alternative bottom-up account is a variant of the referential
coding theory that Dolk and colleagues [16], [17] utilised to
explain the occurrence of a Social Simon effect. According to the
referential coding account, when a sufficiently salient event affords
the referential coding of the response, participants code their
responses in relation to that event [17]. This mode of representing
spatial relations is egocentric since referential coding is formed from
the observer’s perspective (i.e., subject-to-object relation) [62].
Applying this to the present paradigm, instead of co-representing
the co-actor’s actions per se, a participant’s attention may have
been attracted to their co-actor’s response position as a result of
the response and target appearance. This initiated a code in which
the responded-to location became a reference point. For instance,
when the co-actor reached to the participant’s left, this could have
set up a code that facilitated the representation of right, giving rise
to reduced RTs to right-hand targets which induced the basic
congruency effect. Furthermore, as in the Social Simon effect, the
horizontal dimension is a salient aspect in our paradigm [17] and,
as suggested by Hommel et al. [5], the occurrence of another event
along the same dimension should increase the salience of the task
and provide a stronger referential landmark for coding.
Conclusion
In sum, we have demonstrated that a common joint-action
effect can occur even in the absence of a co-actor. While it has
previously been proposed that in joint-action studies individuals
are co-representing each other’s actions, the present findings
indicate that a particular movement congruency effect does not
rely on the ‘‘socialness’’ of the co-actor. Indeed, referring to the
present arm movement phenomenon as a ‘‘movement congruency
effect’’ [24] appears to be a mislabel since it may be due to IOR
rather than congruency of movement.
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